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ABSTRACT 
 
The principal objective of this study was to assess the dynamic dividend behavior of firms in 
Korea. Specifically, this study tests the presence of dividend smoothing and identifies the firm-
level factors influencing the degree of dividend smoothing. For this purpose, 299 firms listed on 
the Korea Stock Exchange over a 26-year period, from 1981 to 2006, were investigated. 
 
The empirical results of this study demonstrate that Korean firms made dividend payments which 
were quite closely related to the average interest rate over the sample period. A change in 
dividend payments is less likely to reflect a change in the fundamentals of Korean companies. 
Instead, it appears to be related significantly to movements in the interest rate. This study also 
finds that the majority of Korean firms pay smoothed dividends. However, the degree of dividend 
smoothing in Korean firms was determined to be lower than that observed in US firms. In 
addition, the results demonstrate that the long–term target payout ratio is significantly lower than 
the observed payout ratio. The results indicate that Lintner’s dividend smoothing model does not 
explain the dynamic dividend behavior in Korea.  
 
The theoretical determinants of dividend smoothing were assessed by regressing the degree of 
dividend smoothing of firms against the firm characteristics. The results show that riskier firms 
tend to pay more smoothed dividends, thus supporting the prediction previously made by Kumar 
(1988). However, contrary to the theoretical predictions, our results find that larger and older 
firms are more likely to smooth dividends in Korea. Controlling shareholder’s ownership, growth, 
and financial slack all appear to exert insignificant effects on the degree of dividend smoothing. 
The results suggest that the information and agency theories of dividend smoothing do not explain 
the dynamic dividend policy of Korean firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ne of the best-known dividend behaviors is the smoothing of firm’s dividends relative to earnings. In 
his seminal paper, Lintner (1956) found that firms in the US smoothly adjust their dividends to maintain 
a target long-run payout ratio. Lintner’s finding of dividend smoothing has been confirmed by a number 
of studies since its publication. Whereas dividend smoothing is a well-established empirical fact, the empirical 
evidence is based principally on information collected in the US market. The dividend policies of corporations differ 
significantly across countries due to a variety of institutional and financial market differences.
1
  
 
The principal objective of this study was to assess the dividend policies of firms in Korea. In particular, this 
study attempted to determine whether Korean firms follow stable dividend policies, as in developed markets in 
which dividend smoothing is a stylized fact. This paper also identifies the firm-level factors influencing the degree 
of dividend smoothing. The paper highlights the importance of institutional features to dividend policy and points to 
                                                 
1 Aivazian (2003) finds that empirical dividend policy equations of emerging market firms are structurally different from those of 
US firms .  
O 
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the advantages of studying dividend policies in different institutional environments. The results of this study provide 
useful insight into the role of institutional factors in deciding dynamic dividend policy at the firm level.  
 
Korea presents several interesting features with regard to the examination of dynamic dividend policy. 
Firstly, Korea is one of the most successful and most rapidly growing economies in the world. The economic growth 
and transformation of the Korean economy has been noted previously by various researchers.
2
  From a poverty-
stricken and economically backward country in 1962 with a GDP per capita of only US$82, Korea has grown into 
the world's 12th largest economy and one of the world's top 10 exporters in 2007.
3
 This rapid economic growth may 
have had significant effects on the dynamic dividend policies of Korean firms. A great deal of empirical research has 
shown that firms tend to pay stable dividends during periods of high growth. Thus, it will be interesting to determine 
how firms set their dynamic dividend policy in a rapidly growing economy such as Korea.  
 
Secondly, the Korean ownership structure is frequently characterized by the dominance of one primary 
owner who manages a sizeable number of affiliated companies with just a small amount of shares. Through a unique 
ownership structure, referred to generally as circular cross-investment (i.e., a pyramid ownership control structure 
coupled to cross-shareholding among subsidiaries), the owner is capable of exercising ownership rights to control 
many companies in different industries. Consequently, there is a possibility of an agency problem in which 
controlling shareholders expropriate value from minority shareholders and thus influence dividend policy. 
 
Thirdly, there is no capital gain tax on listed stocks in Korea, while a tax of 15.4% is applied to the 
dividend income.
4
 Several papers relate dividend signaling to the taxation disadvantage.  It has been well established 
that dividends can be utilized as a credible signal for the value of a firm due to the tax disadvantage of dividend 
payments (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; and Bernheim, 1991). This tax-based explanation indicates 
that Korean firms may exhibit somewhat different dynamic dividend patterns, as unfavorable tax treatments of 
dividend income are more serious than the developed countries like the United States.
5
  
 
Fourthly, unlike US stocks, Korean stocks have a face value which performs an important role in deciding a 
firm’s dividend policy. The Capital Market Promotion Acts of 1968 made it mandatory for listed corporations to pay 
annual dividends divided by the face value at a level equal to the interest rate on one-year time deposits.
6
 Although 
this policy is not enforced, it has been generally understood that the interest rate is a crucial consideration in 
deciding the level of dividend payments in Korea. In this case, changes in the annual dividend payments may merely 
be related to changes in the interest rates rather than reflecting the fundamentals of companies. 
 
This study contributes to the relatively limited literature regarding the determinants of dynamic dividend 
behavior in Korea. The diversity of dividend policies selected by firms appears to indicate that the dividend 
smoothing decision is considerably more important for some firms than for others.  The existing dividend smoothing 
literature is extensive and well-known, yet few empirical investigations have been conducted into the crucial issue as 
to why differences exist in dividend smoothing patterns amongst firms. In this paper, we explore the manner in 
which dividend smoothing differs across firms and empirically examine the factors that help to explain measured 
differences in the extent to which firms smooth their dividends. A number of firm-specific factors are relevant to 
signalling and agency explanations of dividend smoothing, thus implying that the absence of these factors in some 
firms, and their clear presence in others, could empirically explain cross-sectional differences in firms’ dividend 
smoothing behavior. Empirical studies of dividend behavior tend to support the dividend smoothing theory, but have 
not focused on this paper’s goal; namely, the use of a theoretical hypothesis concerning firm-specific factors to 
                                                 
2 See Harvie and Lee (2002). 
3 Wikipedia, 2008. 
4 This is for most investors who own less than 3 percent of total shares or market value of less than 10 billion won. As for 
majority (controlling) shareholders, if stocks are held for less than one year, a 30 percent capital gains tax rate is levied; 
otherwise, 20 percent is applied.  
5 In US, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 has diminished the taxation difference between capital gains 
and dividends.  
6 This custom exists until 2003 when KRX mandates firms to announce dividend payment based on the market value by changing 
its corporate information disclosure system. For exchange listed firms, face value of stock is usually 5,000 KRW. For KOSDAQ listed 
firms, face value of stock is usually 500 KRW. In most cases, market price is significantly different from face value. 
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explain cross-sectional differences in firms’ dividend smoothing behavior.  It should be noted that this is the first 
paper to utilize the factors critical to agency cost and signalling theory models in an effort to empirically explain 
differences in Korean firms’ dividend smoothing behavior. 
 
The empirical results of this study demonstrate that the majority of Korean firms pay smoothed dividends. 
However, the speed of adjustment to the target payout ratio for Korean firms is faster than that of US firms. These 
results imply that Korean firms pay less smoothed dividends than US firms. Theoretical models of dividends based 
on company risk, size, and growth factors perform important functions in the empirical explanation of the cross-
section of dividend smoothing behavior, but a different relationship between these explanatory variables and the 
degree of dividend smoothing exists between US and Korean firms.  The results of our study show that riskier firms 
tend to pay more smoothed dividends, thus supporting the prediction previously made by Kumar (1988). However, 
contrary to the theoretical predictions, our results demonstrate that larger and older firms are more likely to smooth 
dividends in Korea. 
 
Section II discusses studies related to this research. Section III introduces Lintner’s measures of dividend 
smoothing. Theoretical considerations that might influence dividend smoothing decisions are then introduced in 
order to explain differences in firms’ dividend smoothing choices. Section IV provides the cross-sectional test 
results for differences in firms’ dividend smoothing behavior. Section V provides our concluding remarks. 
 
RELATED STUDIES 
 
The dividend smoothing literature has its roots in the research of Lintner (1956). Numerous subsequent 
studies have demonstrated the presence of dividend smoothing at both the individual firm and aggregate levels 
(Fama and Babiak (1968), Laub (1976), Lee, Djarraya and Wu (1987), Marsh and Merton (1987), Garrett and 
Priestley (2000), Kumar and Lee (2001), Allen and Michaely (2003), and Brav et al. (2005)). Several studies have 
attempted to formulate an explanation as to why firms pay smoothed dividends. John and William’s (1985) 
signalling explanation of dividend smoothing constituted an important theoretical development in the dividend 
smoothing hypothesis.  They showed that, in equilibrium, the optimal dividend policy was to pay smoothed 
dividends relative to stock prices.  Their model implies that a higher degree of information asymmetry results in a 
higher degree of dividend smoothing.  Kumar (1988) also developed a signaling model to explain the dividend 
smoothing.  In Kumar's (1988) model, there is a partial pooling of various firm types, and no separating equilibria 
exist.  There is an equilibrium set of ranges of firm value and insiders who can credibly announce the exclusive 
ranges of the firm's true value via specific dividend payments.  In Kumar's signaling equilibrium, a unique level of 
dividends is associated with each distinct range of firm values.  A firm announcing a level of dividends that deviates 
from a certain range is regarded by the market as having a value in the lowest range.  Unlike the dividend smoothing 
concepts propounded by John and Williams (1985), Kumar's dividend smoothing is characterized by a step function 
of earnings, thereby indicating that dividends are a discrete process. Using comparative statistics, he predicted that 
risky firms would tend to smooth dividends more profoundly.  Rozycki (1997) demonstrated that the personal 
income tax provided managers with a motivation to smooth dividend payments. He determined that dividend 
smoothing had increased the wealth for a tax-paying investor by reducing the present value of the investor’s future 
expected income tax liabilities. He also demonstrated that smoothing the dividend stream was more important to 
firms with volatile earnings. Michaely and Roberts (2006) conjectured that ownership structure might play a crucial 
role in dividend smoothing.  According to the study, firms with a higher level of large shareholder ownership are 
less likely to smooth dividends relative to earnings, as they are less related to agency issues and asymmetric 
information.
7
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Empirical evidence suggests that management’s reluctance to cut dividends is partly driven by investors’ reactions to such 
announcements (i.e., Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002)). In addition, Brav et 
al. (2005) report that firms with high owner’s concentration are more likely to pay dividends in response to temporary changes 
in earnings.  
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DTERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND SMOOTHING 
 
This paper employs factors that are either directly or indirectly suggested by previous studies and 
institutional features in order to explain differences in firms’ dividend smoothing behavior. 
 
Measures Of Dividend Smoothing  
 
We measured the degree of dividend smoothing using Lintner’s partial adjustment model. Lintner (1956) 
modelled the change in corporation i’s time t dividend per share,      , as varying proportionately with a speed of 
adjustment factor ci times the amount by which last period’s dividend is exceeded by the current desired payout (the 
desired payout ratio ri times earnings per share EPSi,t):  
 
  𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 ,𝑡  
 
Or 
 
  𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,2 𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 ,𝑡    (1) 
 
where ai is a constant, ui,t is a normally distributed random error term, bi,1=ciri, and bi,2=-ci. Lintner (1956) tested a 
rearranged version of equation (1) on a sample of 26 firms using annual data for the time period from 1918 to 1941, 
and found that the model explained 85% of the variation in dividends. He also showed that the speed of adjustment 
averaged 30% per year, and the target payout ratio averaged 50% of earnings. Using a similar model, Fama and 
Babiak (1968) examined data for two samples of 201 and 191 U.S. firms over the period of 1947 to 1964. Their 
results revealed a slightly higher speed of adjustment, of 36.6%. The Lintner model of dividend smoothing is still 
widely regarded as the standard model for dividend policy. A speed of adjustment parameter, ci, close to 1 indicates 
no proportionate smoothing of dividends relative to percentage changes in earnings, whereas the very low speed of 
adjustment parameter values indicates that dividends move independently of earnings.   
 
Firm Characteristics And Dividend Smoothing 
 
Theory suggests a number of factors that are potentially relevant to empirical explanations of measured 
differences in dividend smoothing behavior. 
 
Information Environment 
 
 Dividend signaling theory indicates that in the presence of asymmetric information, a firm's dividend policy 
can help to credibly convey information held by insiders concerning the firm's future prospects. The model 
constructed by John and Williams (1985) suggests that a firm's information environment is related to the extent to 
which dividends are smoothed relative to earnings. Freeman (1987) and Kross and Schroeder (1988) reported that 
the market prices of large firms reflected earnings more accurately than those of small firms. Thus, it is possible that 
smaller firms may have a greater proclivity to use dividends as a signal of value. In fact, Eddy and Seifert (1988) 
reported that the information content of a dividend change was greater for smaller firms than for large firms. Ghosh 
and Woolridge (1988) and Dewenter and Warther (1998) demonstrated that the market reaction to dividend changes 
was a function of the degree of information asymmetry. All of these considerations imply that size is likely to reduce 
signaling needs and, consequently, the degree of dividend smoothing.  
 
Risk 
 
 Kumar (1988) has predicted that firms in riskier industries are also more likely to smooth dividends in 
order to develop a reputation for having low systematic risk. The results from earnings volatilities studies have 
emphasized the relationship between risk and the incentive to smooth dividends, as high earning volatilities have 
been shown to be associated with lower than expected future profitability and future stock returns (Ronen and Sadan 
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(1981), Chaney and Lewis (1995), and Billings (1999)). High risk companies would have a greater incentive to 
smooth dividends.  
 
Growth 
 
 Signaling theory implies that firms with growth opportunities are more likely to pay dividends to convey 
this information to the market. At the same time, these firms will also have a greater need to retain a higher 
proportion of earnings to support their valuable investment projects. This combination of requirements results in 
declining dividend payout ratios and smoothed dividends relative to earnings for firms with high growth rates. A 
further implication of this combination of requirements is that high growth firms are likely to be more sensitive to 
the tradeoff between dividend signaling needs and dividend signaling costs, whereas low growth firms will be much 
less sensitive to the tradeoff because they would not wish to use costly signals. Therefore, growth is expected to be 
negatively related to the degree of dividend smoothing, since the deviation from the smoothed dividend becomes a 
more expensive signal for high growth firms.   
 
Ownership Structure  
  
It is well known that a pattern of stable dividend payments can mitigate the agency costs of equity, while 
also signaling the consistent quality of the firm's earnings. Gomes (2000) and La Porta et al. (2000) have argued that 
this solution depends on the ownership structure of the firm. Stable dividends may be an optimal solution for a firm 
with a dispersed share ownership. However, closely held firms may not need to signal earnings quality and may not 
need to solve the agency problem. For instance, Dewenter and Warther (1998) applied the Lintner model to Japanese 
firms that were members of a Keiretsu, and reported that the Keiretsu firm paid dividends in a manner highly 
sensitive to corporate earnings. These findings suggest that ownership structure influences the need for dividends to 
reduce the agency problem and to provide managerial monitoring. For closely held firms, the immediate change in 
fundamental value is less visible and, thus, potentially less important for the dividend decision-making process. In 
fact, Brav et al. (2005) reported that closely held firms regarded the consequences of dividend cuts and omissions to 
be less serious.  They demonstrated that closely held firms were more likely to pay dividends in response to 
temporary changes in earnings than were firms with diffused ownership.  This discussion suggests that firms with 
diffused ownership will be likely to smooth their dividends more than is the case with closely held firms.   
 
Financial Slack 
 
 Financial slack can also be considered to be a potentially important factor in the decision to smooth 
dividends. The presence of financial slack will, in theory, reduce external financing requirements and thus solve the 
"underinvestment" problem, thereby reducing the signaling needs of firms and the incentive to smooth dividends 
(Myers & Majluf (1984), and John & Williams (1985)). Financial slack is expected to have an inverse relationship 
with the degree of dividend smoothing. 
 
 Theoretical explanations of differences in firms’ dividend smoothing measures were assessed in this study 
using the following cross-sectional regression model: 
 
Ci = β0 + β1
SIZE + β
2
LARGE + β
3
HISTORY + β
4
SLACK + β
5
EV + +β
6
GROWTH 
 (2) 
 
where firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of total assets, growth (GROWTH) is measured by the 
growth rate in size over at least a 15-year period, financial slack (SLACK) is the ratio of accumulated retained 
earnings to total assets, and earnings variability (RISK) is assessed using the standard deviation of earnings per 
share over at least a 15-year period. Listing years (HISTORY) is measured by the number of years listed during the 
sample period. The percentage of the stock held by the largest shareholders (OWN) is used as a proxy for the 
concentration of controlling shareholders.  Degree of dividend smoothing (DDS) is measured by the speed of 
adjustment, Ci, in equation (1). The theory implies the following coefficient signs: β1, β2, β3&β4 > 0, β5, β6 < 0. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 Equation (1) was fitted to a sample of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over the 26-year period 
from 1981 to 2006 in order to estimate the measures of the degree of dividend smoothing of firms. The following 
sample selection criteria were employed: 
 
1. Firms had to have at least 15 years of earnings and dividend data during the period 1980-2006, as reported 
in the Korea Listed Companies Association database.  
 
2. When estimating Eq. (1), all firms with non-positive EPS or zero dividends were eliminated from the 
sample, in order to prevent the spurious results of dividend smoothing. 
 
3. A further screen excluded firms with less than 15 observations for each firm characteristic variable used in 
the regression. From a total of 732 firms, 299 firms fulfilled these screening criteria. 
 
 The exclusion of firms with negative earnings and zero dividends has the advantage of eliminating 
"spurious dividend smoothing." This spurious dividend smoothing arises naturally, rather than being the result of the 
conscious management of dividend policy. Dividend smoothing implies a deliberate effort on the part of managers 
to adjust dividend payments in response to variations in the earnings stream. 
 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.  From this table, the following remarks are found: 
 
 
Table 1:  Sample Statistics 
Variable* Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Ci 0.7033 0.2463 0.0870 1.4640 
SIZE 18.6855 1.1652 16.3413 24.2445 
OWN 30.0319 11.9095 6.5146 82.3063 
SLACK 0.1763 0.1099 0.0133 0.5811 
RISK 2.7466 4.1652 0.1472 44.4989 
GROWTH 0.1383 0.0985 -0.0651 0.8482 
Target payout ratio  0.1813 0.1462 0.0010 0.9225 
HISTORY 18.9512 3.9915 13.0000 26.0000 
DE 0.4057 0.2750 0.0738 3.5506 
EXP 0.5191 0.2179 0.0556 0.9967 
* Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of total assets, growth rate (GROWTH) is the average growth rate of size 
over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty six years, financial slack (SLACK) is the ratio of 
accumulated retained earnings to total assets, and earnings variability (RISK) is measured using the standard deviation of 
earnings per share over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty-six years. Listing years (HISTORY) 
is measured by the number of years listed during the sample period. The percentage of the stock held by the largest shareholders 
(OWN) is used as a proxy for the concentration of controlling shareholders. Dividend payout ratio (DE) is measured by dividends 
per share divided by earnings per share. Ci is measured by the speed of adjustment in equation (1). EXP is the explanatory power 
of the Lintner model. 
 
 
 The average speed of adjustment is 68% and the target payout ratio is 18.3%. The model explained 51% of 
the variation in dividends. As compared with the US results, the table demonstrates that dividend behavior in Korea 
is explained less well by the Lintner model, and dividends are more sensitive to changes in temporary earnings. For 
example, the one estimated by Lintner was approximately 30%, with a target payout ratio of 50%. Lintner’s implicit 
target payout ratio appears to be substantially higher than ours. The estimations of the Lintner model for Korean 
firms indicate that dividend decisions are not predicated on the long-term target payouts, as was hypothesized 
originally by Lintner (1956). This view is supported by the lower target payout ratios, which deviate substantially 
from the observed payout ratios. With regard to average dividend payments, Korean firms paid 480 KRW (or 0.48 
USD) per share.
8
 The average dividend payout ratio is 40.5%, which is lower than that of US firms.
9
  The lower 
                                                 
8
 Average dividend payout ratio is calculated by EPS*DE.  
9
 Aivazian. (2003). 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – June 2011 Volume 10, Number 6 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  27 
observed payout ratio in Korea may be attributable to the different tax treatment of dividend income tax relative to 
the capital gains tax. Korean firms appear to have less incentive to pay dividends, as the unfavorable tax treatment of 
dividend income over capital gain is more serious than is the case in the US.
10
 In addition, many investors in Korea 
disregard dividends and consider stock price appreciation as the principal component of stock returns. Korean 
investor’s attitude toward dividends seems to also contribute to lower dividend payout ratios.   
 
 It has been generally understood that the interest rate is a crucial consideration for deciding the level of 
dividend payments in Korea. To investigate this issue, we have compared the dividend yields (based on face value) 
with the deposit rates during the sample period. The average dividend payment is 10.9% of the face value, which is 
2.3 % higher than the average deposit rate during the sample period. However, Figure 1 and Table 2 demonstrate the 
existence of a systematic relationship between dividend payments and deposit rates. Table 2 shows that dividend 
yields are related positively to the average deposit interest rate from 1981 to 1995, during which time the rate was 
regulated by the government.
11
  As the deposit rate was liberalized, the dividend yield becomes negatively related 
with the deposit rate. The correlation coefficient between the dividend yield and the deposit rate was 68% during the 
period from 1981 to 1995, and then became -89% during the period between 1996 and 2006. These results indicate 
that the deposit rate performs a crucial function in deciding dividend payments for Korean firms.  
 
Table 2:  The Relationship Between Deposit Rate And Dividend Payment Divided By Face Value 
Year Dividend Payment/Face Value Deposit Rate 
1981 0.1771 0.162 
1982 0.1168 0.08 
1983 0.1208 0.08 
1984 0.1166 0.1 
1985 0.1233 0.1 
1986 0.1301 0.1 
1987 0.09477 0.1 
1988 0.10859 0.1 
1989 0.09655 0.1 
1990 0.10705 0.1 
1991 0.0868 0.1 
1992 0.08054 0.1 
1993 0.06854 0.085 
1994 0.07705 0.0925 
1995 0.08171 0.0875 
1996 0.05907 0.1079 
1997 0.05923 0.1132 
1998 0.05446 0.133 
1999 0.1017 0.069 
2000 0.11631 0.071 
2001 0.0871 0.0543 
2002 0.12163 0.0473 
2003 0.14036 0.0415 
2004 0.17843 0.0375 
2005 0.18239 0.0346 
2006 0.14595 0.045 
Mean (1981-2006) 0.1089 0.08620 
Mean (1981-1995) 0.10573 0.09913 
Mean (1996-2006) 0.0956 0.09146 
Correlation (1981-2006) -0.3901 
Correlation (1981-1995) 0.68343 
Correlation (1996-2006) -0.8907 
                                                 
10 There is no capital gain tax on listed stocks in Korea while 15.4% of tax is applied to the dividend income. 
11 Korea has undertaken interest liberalization as a part of economic reforms since the curly 1990s. The four-phase plan for 
interest rate liberalization was announced in 1991 and deposit rate liberalization was completed in 1995 during the third stage of 
the interest rate liberalization plan. 
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Figure 1:  The Relationship between Deposit Rate and Dividend Payment Divided by Face Value 
 
 
Table 3 contains correlation coefficients between the variables utilized in the multi-variate regressions. The 
dividend smoothing measure, Ci, evidences significant correlation coefficients with SIZE, HISTORY, RISK, and 
GROWTH.  It is apparent that some independent variables are correlated highly with each other. SLACK is 
negatively correlated with SIZE, a finding which is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and 
Majluf (1984).  HISTORY has significant correlation coefficients with the majority of other independent variables 
in equation (2), with the exception of SLACK.  The potential for multi-collinearity suggests that the re-estimation of 
variations of Eq. (2) with only uncorrelated independent variables may be needed. 
 
 
Table 3:  Pair-Wise Correlation Between Variables 
 Ci SIZE OWN HISTORY SLACK RISK GROWTH 
Ci 1.0000       
SIZE -0.2653 1.0000      
 (<.0001)       
OWN -0.0267 -0.1447 1.0000     
 (0.6477) (0.0127)      
HISTORY -0.3180 0.2523 -0.0663 1.0000    
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2557)     
SLACK 0.0665 -0.3894 0.3424 0.0431 1.0000   
 (0.2541) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4598)    
RISK -0.1776 0.1130 0.1306 0.2048 0.2519 1.0000  
 (0.0022) (0.0521) (0.0246) (0.0004) (<.0001)   
GROWTH -0.1248 0.4919 -0.0863 -0.1097 -0.2129 0.0062 1.0000 
 (0.0318) (<.0001) (0.1385) (0.0595) (0.0002) (0.9153)  
* Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of total assets, growth rate (GROWTH) is the average growth rate of size 
over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty six years, financial slack (SLACK) is the ratio of 
accumulated retained earnings to total assets, and earnings variability (RISK) is measured using the standard deviation of 
earnings per share over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty-six years. Listing years (HISTORY) 
is measured by the number of years listed during the sample period. The percentage of the stock held by the largest shareholders 
(OWN) is used as a proxy for the concentration of controlling shareholders. Ci is measured by the speed of adjustment in 
equation (1). P-values are contained in parentheses. 
 
We test the relationship between the firm characteristics and the firm's dividend smoothing pattern using a 
multivariate regression analysis. Table 4 depicts the results for a multivariate regression for the complete sample of 
dividend smoothing firms. 
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Table 4:  Multivariate Regressions Of Smoothing Factor On Firm-Specific Variables* 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Intercept 1.5603 <.0001 1.7156 <.0001 
SIZE -0.0252 0.0773 -0.0367 0.0007 
OWN -0.0015 0.1954   
HISTORY -0.0183 <.0001 -0.01627 <.0001 
SLACK 0.1887 0.2765   
RISK -0.0060 0.0492 -0.00531 0.0582 
GROWTH -0.2099 0.1855   
 R-Square= 0.1603, Adj R-Sq= 0.1398 R-Square = 0.1482, Adj R-Sq= 0.1342 
*Regressions of smoothing factor on firm-specific variables are reported. Computation of the smoothing factor is described in 
Table 1. P-values are contained in parentheses. Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of total assets, growth rate 
(GROWTH) is the average growth rate of size over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty six years, 
financial slack (SLACK) is the ratio of accumulated retained earnings to total assets, and earnings variability (RISK) is measured 
using the standard deviation of earnings per share over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty-six 
years. Listing years (HISTORY) is measured by the number of years listed during the sample period. The percentage of the stock 
held by the largest shareholders (OWN) is used as a proxy for the concentration of controlling shareholders. Smoothing factor is 
measured by Ci , the speed of adjustment in equation (1). 
 
 
Model 1 is estimated using all the variables in the equation (1), whereas Model 2 is the re-estimation of 
Model 1 using a stepwise regression technique to minimize the problem of multi-collinearity. The results in Model 1 
demonstrate that firm’s size and listing years have significantly negative coefficients, suggesting that larger and 
older firms are more likely to smooth dividends. The result is not consistent with the theoretical predictions 
suggested by the signalling theory of dividends. Signaling theory indicates that smaller and younger firms have a 
greater incentive to smooth dividends since the information revealed with dividend changes is significantly high for 
these firms (Ghosh and Woolridge (1988), and Dewenter and Warher (1998)). However, the results for Korean firms 
provide the opposite evidence. It appears that the dividend smoothing hypothesis based on the signaling theory is not 
supported in the case of Korea. Risk has a negative sign, thereby indicating that riskier firms tend to pay more 
smoothed dividends. The result is consistent with the prediction made by Kumar (1988). Kumar predicted that firms 
in the risky industries are more likely to smooth dividends in order to develop a reputation for having a low 
systematic risk. GROWTH, OWN, and SLACK show insignificant coefficients, suggesting that other theories of 
dividend smoothing including the agency theory do not explain the dividend smoothing patterns in Korea. The 
results from the re-estimation of Model 1 that drop correlated variables from the regression are also consistent with 
the findings for the full model. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study evaluates the dividend policies of Korean firms. The research described herein focused on 
investigating the manner in which Korean firms establish their dynamic dividend policies in a different institutional 
environment than that of developed markets, such as the US.  In particular, this study attempted to empirically 
determine whether Korean firms follow stable dividend policies as in developed markets where dividend smoothing 
is a stylized fact. The paper also identified firm-level factors that influence the degree of dividend smoothing.  For 
this purpose, 299 firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over the 26-year period (1980 to 2006) were 
investigated. 
 
 The empirical results presented in this study demonstrate that the majority of Korean firms pay smoothed 
dividends. However, the speed of adjustment to the target payout ratio is more rapid than in the developed market, 
thereby implying a lesser degree of dividend smoothing. The average speed of adjustment is 68% and the Lintner 
model explains 52% of the dividend changes of Korean firms. As compared with the US, Korean dividend behavior 
is explained less by the Lintner model and Korean firms pay smoothed dividends to a lesser degree. A change in 
dividend payments is less likely to reflect a change in the fundamentals of the company. Rather, it is closely 
associated with the interest rates of one-year time deposits. These results also indicate that dividend decisions in 
Korea are not predicated on long-term target payouts, as was hypothesized originally by Lintner (1956). This view is 
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supported by the implicit payout ratios, which deviate substantially from the observed payout ratios. The long–term 
target ratio is 18.3%, and is significantly lower than the observed payout ratio. The average observed payout ratio 
for Korean firms is also lower than that of US firms. This result may be attributable to the unfavorable tax treatment 
of dividend income in Korea.  
 
 For the determinants of dividend smoothing, company risk, size, and listing year perform crucial functions 
in the empirical explanation of the cross-section of dividend smoothing behavior. However, the relationships 
between these explanatory variables and the degree of dividend smoothing are systematically different between 
firms in the US and Korea. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, our empirical findings demonstrate that the larger 
and older firms are more likely to smooth dividends. Financial slack, growth, and ownership structure exert 
insignificant effects on the degree of dividend smoothing. These results indicate that information and agency 
theories do not explain the dynamic dividend behavior of Korean firms. Our results also show that riskier firms tend 
to pay more smoothed dividends, which supports the prediction made by Kumar (1988).  
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